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On the Efficiency of Codeshare Contracts between 
Airlines: Is Double Marginalization Eliminated?†
By Philip G. Gayle*
Previous research has suggested that codeshare agreements 
eliminate double marginalization that exists when unaffiliated 
airlines independently determine the price for different segments 
of an interline trip. Using a structural econometric model, this 
paper investigates whether codeshare contracts do eliminate 
double marginalization. The results suggest that both upstream 
and downstream margins persist when the operating carrier of a 
codeshare product also offers competing single-carrier product(s) in 
the concerned market. Furthermore, counterfactual simulations from 
the model suggest that efficient pricing of these codeshare products 
would lower their price, and yield nontrivial increases in consumer 
welfare. (JEL D86, L13, L14, L93)
Codesharing constitutes a contractual agreement among airlines that allows a carrier, called the “ticketing carrier,” to market and sell seats on its  partner’s 
plane for segments of a route operated by its partner (the “operating carrier”). 
“Traditional” codeshare itineraries combine connecting operating services of part-
ner carriers on a given route. For example, in traveling from Denver to Philadelphia, 
a passenger may buy the codeshare round-trip ticket from United Airlines, but the 
itinerary involves flying on a United-operated airplane from Denver to Boston, then 
connecting to a US Airways-operated airplane from Boston to Philadelphia.
Codesharing combines the operating services of at least two separate carriers. 
One of the carriers is responsible for marketing and sets the final price for the entire 
round-trip ticket, and compensates the other carrier for their operating services on 
a segment of the trip. It is reasonable to view codesharing as a vertical relationship 
between upstream and downstream firms. The pure operating carrier is equivalent to 
an upstream supplier that provides an essential input (operate a trip segment) to the 
downstream ticketing carrier, who then combines it with complementary trip seg-
ments in order to provide the final product to consumers.1
1 Though not focussing on the economics of codesharing, Forbes and Lederman (2009, 2010) also view the 
relationship between major carriers and their regional feeder carriers in a vertical context.
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An often cited argument is that codesharing eliminates double marginaliza-
tion that would otherwise exist when unaffiliated airlines independently determine 
the price for different segments of an interline trip (Brueckner, Lee, and Singer 
2011; Brueckner and Proost 2010; Ito and Lee 2007; Brueckner and Whalen 2000; 
Brueckner 2001; Brueckner 2003; and Bamberger, Carlton, and Neumann 2004). 
The logic is that partners jointly price their codeshare products and therefore will 
price the trip segment (intermediate product) of any partner airline at the true mar-
ginal cost (Chen and Gayle 2007).
Chen and Gayle (2007) formally examine this pricing argument. In their theoreti-
cal analysis, double marginalization is not necessarily eliminated when partner air-
lines price their codeshare product. They study the equilibrium pricing incentives of 
partners in an alliance, and consider the endogenous formation of the alliance when 
multiple airlines can offer the intermediate flight. They find that codesharing may 
not eliminate double marginalization if a codeshare partner also offers a competing 
single-carrier product in the concerned market. If neither codeshare partner offers 
a competing single-carrier product, then codesharing does result in marginal cost 
pricing of the intermediate flight and lowers final prices.
The main contribution of this paper is to test Chen and Gayle (2007) theoretical 
prediction. I take the existing product set as given and estimate a structural economet-
ric model of air travel demand and supply using data on US domestic air travel. The 
econometric model disentangles equilibrium final product prices into three compo-
nents: (i) upstream margin; (ii) downstream margin; and (iii) marginal cost; which 
allows for a direct empirical test of whether double marginalization is eliminated. 
In the spirit of work by Villas-Boas (2007); Bonnet, Dubois, and Simioni (2006); 
Bonnet and Dubois (2010); and Bonnet, Dubois, and Villas-Boas (forthcoming), I 
use nonnested statistical tests for supply model selection to assess whether the data 
are consistent with a positive upstream margin for codeshare products in which a 
partner airline also offers a competing single-carrier product.
It is useful to describe why a codeshare agreement may not eliminate double 
marginalization. In the absence of an agreement between two carriers providing an 
interline trip, each carrier chooses its fare to maximize its own profit on the segment 
of the trip it operates. Neither carrier takes into account how its own pricing decision 
affects the profit of the complementary carrier (Brueckner 2003). Under a codeshare 
agreement, the carriers negotiate a pricing contract that can internalize the external-
ity and maximize their joint profit. Therefore, it is natural to expect such agree-
ments will eliminate double marginalization and result in efficient pricing. However, 
when the partners negotiate a price contract, if the upstream/pure operating carrier 
also offers its own competing single-carrier product, this carrier has an incentive to 
soften downstream competition for its own product by not eliminating the margin on 
its segment of the codeshare product.
Consistent with Chen and Gayle (2007), my econometric estimates suggest that 
the markup of the pure operating carrier is not eliminated when this partner car-
rier also offers a competing single-carrier product. This finding is important since 
the pure operating carrier offers competing single-carrier products for 81 percent 
of codeshare products. The empirical result may also be linked to the literature 
on vertical integration, which predicts that under some circumstances a vertically 
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 integrated firm, unlike an unintegrated firm, has an incentive to raise the input price 
to rival downstream firms to increase the competitive advantage of the downstream 
operations of the integrated firm (Hastings and Gilbert 2005; Chen 2001).
This is not the first paper to present evidence suggesting that double marginal-
ization might not be eliminated from codeshare products. Ito and Lee (2007) find 
that traditional codeshare products are roughly 11.6  percent less expensive than 
interline products offered by nonallied carriers, but also that the codeshare products 
are 6.4  percent more expensive than single-carrier products in the same market. 
Single-carrier products by definition do not have double marginalization. If compet-
ing codeshare products also do not have double marginalization, their prices should 
not systematically differ from single-carrier products. One interpretation of Ito and 
Lee’s (2007) finding is that double marginalization is not eliminated from tradi-
tional codeshare products. My analysis explicitly estimates the markups to directly 
test for elimination of double marginalization.
A useful feature of the structural econometric model is that counterfactual simu-
lations can be performed to reveal how equilibrium prices, air travel demand, and 
consumer welfare are affected if codeshare products with double markup were 
efficiently priced. I artificially eliminate the upstream margin for these codeshare 
products in the sample to predict changes in equilibrium prices, air travel demand, 
and consumer surplus. I find that: (i) prices of these products decrease; (ii) num-
ber of passengers that purchase these products increase; and (iii) consumer surplus 
increase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Definitions used throughout the 
paper are gathered in Section  I. Section  II describes the data used in estimation. 
Section III outlines the structural econometric model of air travel demand and  supply. 
Estimation issues are discussed in Section IV. Results are discussed in Section V, 
and Section VI offers concluding remarks.
I. Definitions
A market is defined as directional round-trip air travel between an origin and des-
tination city during a given time period. The assumption that markets are directional 
implies that round-trip air travel from Denver to Philadelphia is a distinct market 
as compared to round-trip air travel from Philadelphia to Denver. Furthermore, this 
directional assumption allows for the possibility that origin city characteristics may 
influence market demand.
A flight itinerary is defined as a specific sequence of airport stops in traveling 
from the origin to destination city. Products are defined as a unique combination of 
airline(s) and flight itinerary. An online product means that a passenger remains on 
a single carrier’s network for all segments of a round trip. For example, three sepa-
rate online products are: (i) a nonstop round trip from Denver to Philadelphia on US 
Airways; (ii) a round trip from Denver to Philadelphia with one stop in Charlotte 
on US Airways; and (iii)  a nonstop round trip from Denver to Philadelphia on 
Northwest Airlines. Note that all three products are in the same market.
In contrast, for the type of codeshare products I focus on in this paper, referred to 
as “traditional” codeshare in the literature (see Ito and Lee 2007; and Gayle 2008), 
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passengers change airlines at least once on the round trip, but a single airline, nor-
mally referred to as the “ticketing carrier,” is responsible for marketing and selling 
the ticket for the entire round trip. In addition, the ticketing carrier also provides 
operating services on at least one segment of the interline trip. The route network 
diagram in Figure 1 provides an example of a traditional codeshare product in the 
Denver to Philadelphia market. The codeshare product uses an interline itinerary 
between United Airlines and US Airways that has US Airways as a pure operating 
carrier on a trip segment, and United Airlines as the ticketing carrier. The passenger 
bought the round-trip ticket from United Airlines since United is the ticketing car-
rier for this codeshare product. However, the product’s itinerary requires the pas-
senger to first fly on a United Airlines-operated plane from Denver to Boston, then 
connect to a US Airways-operated plane from Boston to Philadelphia.
There are cases in which codeshare itineraries only involve a single operating 
carrier for the entire trip even though the ticket for the trip was marketed and sold 
by a partner carrier. Such itineraries are referred to as “virtual” codesharing; but 
unlike “traditional” codesharing, it is argued that airlines’ incentive to offer virtual 
codeshare tickets is not related to their desire to eliminate double marginalization. 
As such, this paper focuses on traditional codesharing, and in what follows, code-
sharing should be interpreted in the traditional context. Ito and Lee (2007) provide 
detail discussions of virtual codesharing versus traditional codesharing and airlines’ 
incentives for engaging in each type of codesharing (also see Gayle 2008, 2007b; 
and Gayle and Xie 2012).2
Throughout the paper, “upstream” and “downstream” carriers do not corre-
spond to which plane a codeshare passenger boards first on the interline itinerary. 
Upstream carrier simply means the pure operating carrier, which could be the 
2 Gayle and Xie (2012) investigate the relative importance of traditional codesharing versus virtual codesharing 




United Airlines plane with 
some codeshare passengers 
that are destined for 
Philadelphia.
US Airways plane with 
some United Airlines-
ticketed passengers that 
originate in Denver and 
are destined for 
Philadelphia.
Figure 1. Route Network Diagram
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 operating carrier for any segment of the interline trip, while the downstream car-
rier is the ticketing carrier that also operates a segment of the trip, which could be 
the first segment. We can therefore think of the pure operating carrier as equivalent 
to an upstream supplier that provides an essential input (operate a trip segment) to 
the downstream carrier who then combines it with other inputs (complementary 
trip segments) in order to provide the final product to consumers. As such, in the 
example above, US Airways is the upstream carrier, while United Airlines is the 
downstream carrier.
I label a codeshare product and the upstream carrier of the codeshare product 
as “integrated” if the upstream carrier simultaneously offers competing online 
product(s) in the same market, otherwise the codeshare product and the upstream 
carrier are labeled as “unintegrated.” In Figure 1, the codeshare product and US 
Airways are considered unintegrated since US Airways does not offer an online prod-
uct in the Denver to Philadelphia market. However, consider a situation in which US 
Airways also offers its own nonstop product between Denver and Philadelphia. In 
that case, the one-stop codeshare product between United Airlines and US Airways 
is an imperfect substitute for the nonstop online product offered by US Airways. As 
such, both products compete with each other and the codeshare product along with 
US Airways are considered integrated.
II. Data
The data are drawn from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), which is a 
10 percent random sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers. This database 
is maintained and published by the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Some of 
the items included in DB1B are: (i) the number of passengers that choose a given 
flight itinerary; (ii) the fares of these itineraries; (iii) the specific sequence of airport 
stops that each itinerary uses in getting passengers from the origin to destination 
city; (iv) the carrier that marketed and sold the travel ticket (ticketing carriers), and 
the carrier(s) that passengers actually fly on for their trip (operating carriers); and 
(v) the distance flown on each itinerary in a directional market. The distance associ-
ated with each itinerary in a market may differ since each itinerary may use different 
connecting airports in transporting passengers from the origin to destination city. 
Unfortunately, there is no passenger-specific information in the data, nor is there 
any information on ticket restrictions such as advance-purchase and length-of-stay 
requirements. The frequency of the data are quarterly. For this research, I focus on 
the US domestic market in 2006 from quarter one to quarter four.
To construct the sample for estimation, I first drop itineraries with price less 
than $100 due to the high probability that these may be coding errors. In addition, 
this restriction helps to eliminate discounted fares that may be due to passengers 
using frequent-flyer miles to partly pay for the product. The data are then col-
lapsed by averaging the price and aggregating the number of passengers purchas-
ing products as defined by itinerary-airline(s) combination. In other words, before 
the data are collapsed, there are several observations of a given itinerary-airline(s) 
combination that are distinguished by prices paid and number of passengers pay-
ing each of those prices.
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The data are further pruned based on several restrictions. First, I select products 
that were bought by at least ten passengers during a given quarter, and markets that 
have at least ten products with at least one of these products being a traditional 
codeshare product. Berry (1992) and Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) among others 
use similar, and sometimes more stringent, number of passengers threshold to help 
eliminate idiosyncratic product offerings that are not part of the normal set of prod-
ucts offered in a market. Since the focus of this paper is on traditional codesharing 
between airlines, and traditional codeshare products are not nearly as popular as 
online products (see Ito and Lee 2007), the data sample needs to have markets that 
contain sufficient traditional codeshare products to facilitate proper econometric 
identification of codesharing effects. This explains the requirement that each sample 
market has at least one traditional codeshare product.
Table 1 reports summary data for market characteristics on markets that remained 
in the sample—“in-sample” markets—compared to characteristics of markets that 
do not have any codeshare products, and therefore did not survive the pruning pro-
cess used to construct the working data sample—“out-of-sample” markets. The table 
shows that market characteristics, as measured by origin city population, nonstop 
flight distance, number of substitute products per market, and number of competing 
carriers per market, are all larger in magnitude for in-sample markets compared to 
out-of-sample markets. The difference in means of each measured market charac-
teristic across in-sample versus out-of-sample markets is statistically significant at 
conventional levels of statistical significance. In summary, we can conclude that, 
relative to out-of-sample markets, in-sample markets are: (i)  larger in terms of 
potential passengers; (ii) require longer travel distances; and (iii) more competitive 
in terms of number of substitute products, and number of competing carriers.






























Number of traditional codeshare products per market 2.96
(0.096)
0 —






Number of markets 220 361
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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A second sample restriction is that I focus on traditional codeshare and online 
products as defined previously. Thus, I do not consider complicated products where 
a subset of the trip segments are codeshared while other segments are operated by 
unaffiliated carriers. Third, I follow the standard practice for empirical analyses of 
airline codesharing, and recode regional feeder carriers to have their major carrier 
codes. This paper, like much of the literature on airline codesharing, focuses on 
codesharing between major carriers. Therefore, if I did not recode feeder carriers, 
then products that only include a major carrier and its associated regional feeder 
carrier(s) may “mistakenly” be counted as codeshare products since the operating 
and ticketing carrier codes would differ. For example, American Eagle (MQ) is a 
regional feeder carrier for American Airlines (AA), a major carrier. So a product that 
is purchased from AA, but has an itinerary that requires the passenger to fly on MQ 
for a segment of the trip, will be mistakenly classified as a codeshare product if I do 
not recode the MQ flight to have the AA code. The resulting sample used in estima-
tion covers 220 markets and has 3,924 observations/products.
Product characteristics that influence consumers’ air travel demand are cap-
tured using the following variables: “Price,” “Hub,” “Inconvenient,” “Hub  × 
Inconvenient,” and “Codeshare,” while ticketing carrier3 dummy variables are used 
to control for a portion of unobserved product characteristics, and time dummies 
are used to control for seasonal demand effects. “Price” is the mean fare of a given 
itinerary-airline(s) combination; “Hub” is a zero-one dummy variable that takes the 
value one only if the origin airport is a hub for the ticketing carrier; “Inconvenient” is 
the ratio of itinerary distance to the nonstop distance between the origin and destina-
tion airports; “Hub × Inconvenient” is the interaction of “Hub” and “Inconvenient”; 
and “Codeshare” is a dummy variable taking the value one if the product is code-
shared, and zero otherwise. An itinerary is presumed to be less convenient the larger 
is its “Inconvenient” measure. The minimum value that “Inconvenient” can take is 
one, which occurs when an itinerary uses a single nonstop flight between the origin 
and destination city.
Some defining characteristics of the data are as follows: 16.59 percent of the 
products are codeshared, while the remaining products are online. For 81.41 percent 
of the codeshare products, the upstream carrier/pure operating carrier also offers 
their own competing online products in the same market. Jet fuel price is an average 
192.43 cents per gallon over the sample period, ranging from 175.48 to 206.81 cents 
per gallon.4 Additional summary statistics are reported in Table 2. In Appendix A, 
a list of the airlines in the sample are reported in Table A1; and a list of the cities, 
states, and corresponding airports in the data sample are reported in Table A2.
3 I use ticketing carrier dummies rather than operating carrier dummies in the demand model since it is the 
ticketing carrier that interacts with the consumer in the marketing and selling of a codeshare product. The issue 
of ticketing versus operating carrier does not arise for online products since a single carrier performs both roles for 
the entire itinerary.
4 The data source for jet fuel price is: US Energy Information Administration: Official Energy Statistics from 
the US Government.
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III. The Model
I now outline a model of air travel demand and supply. I begin with the demand 
side, which is modeled within a discrete choice framework. Specifically, I use a ran-
dom coefficients logit demand model. I then outline the supply side of the model, 
which is where the vertical contracting is captured. It must be noted however that 
the empirical model assumes that the existing menu of products offered in a market, 
and firms’ choice of whether to form a codeshare alliance, are predetermined at the 
time of optimal price-setting behavior. Since the focus of this paper is on optimal 
price-setting behavior conditional on the menu of products that already exists in the 
market, a more general model in which codeshare alliance formation is endogenous 
is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.
A. Demand
Potential passenger i in market t faces a choice between  J t + 1 alternatives. There 
are  J t + 1 alternatives because I allow passengers the option  ( j = 0 ) not to choose 
one of the  J t differentiated air travel products considered in the empirical model. A 
passenger chooses the product that gives him the highest utility; that is
(1)  max   
j∈ { 0, … ,  J t } 
 {  U ijt =  x jt  β i +  α i p jt +  a j + ξ jt +  ε ijt } , 
where  U ijt is the value of product j to passenger i ;  x jt is a vector of observed nonprice 
product characteristics (a measure of itinerary convenience, a zero-one indicator 
variable that takes the value one only if the origin is a hub for the carrier that offers 
the product for sale, a zero-one indicator variable that takes the value one only if 
the product is codeshare, and time dummy variables);  β i is a vector of consumer-
specific marginal utilities (assumed random) associated with the different nonprice 
product characteristics in  x jt ; p jt is the price that a consumer must pay to consume 
product j ;  α i represents consumer-specific marginal utility of price (also assumed 
random across consumers);  a j are firm fixed effects (ticketing carrier dummy 
Table 2—Summary Statistics
Codeshare products
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
Price ($) 237.15 64.77 123.11 685.04
Hub 0.23 0.42 0 1
Inconvenient 1.114 0.13 1.0004 1.525
Itinerary distance (miles) 2,369.46 488.19 1,005 3,565
Online products
Price ($) 236.55 64.59 126.93 875.31
Hub 0.10 0.30 0 1
Inconvenient 1.087 0.106 1 1.909
Itinerary distance (miles) 2,307.43 455.04 866 3,695
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variables) capturing characteristics of the products that are the same across markets 
and time; ξ jt is a measure of differences in product quality that are unobserved by 
the researcher, but observed by consumers and firms; and  ε ijt is a mean-zero random 
component of utility.
Following much of the discrete choice demand literature (see Nevo 2000a),  ε ijt is 
assumed to be governed by an independent and identically distributed extreme value 
density. The probability that product j is chosen, or equivalently the predicted (by 
the model) market share of product j is
(2)  d jt ( x jt , p jt ; α, β, σ) =  ∫   
 
  e 
 δ jt +μ ijt   __  
1 +  ∑ 
l=1
J
  e  δ l t  + μ ilt  
 dF(ν), 
where  δ jt =  x jt β + α p jt +  a j + ξ jt is the mean utility (across consumers) obtained 
from consuming product j ; and μ ijt =  σ p p jt  v ip +  ∑ k=1 
K
  σ k  x jtk  v ik is a consumer-spe-
cific deviation from the mean utility level which depends on the consumers’ taste 
for each product characteristic, where σ =  ( σ p  ,  σ 1 , … ,  σ K ) is a set of parameters 
that measure variation (across consumers) in random taste shocks for respective 
product characteristics, and  v i =  ( v ip ,  v i1 , … ,  v iK ) is a set of consumer  i′ s random 
taste shocks for respective product characteristics. F( ⋅ ) is the standard normal dis-
tribution function that governs the taste shocks. As is well known in the empirical 
industrial organization literature, there is no closed-form solution for the integral 
in equation (2), and thus it must be approximated numerically using random draws 
from F(ν).5
Given market size of measure  M t , which I assume to be the size of the population 
in the origin city, observed share of product j in market t is  D jt =  
q jt 
 _ M t  , where q jt is 
the actual number of travel tickets sold for a particular itinerary-airline(s) combi-
nation called product j. The observed market share for each product is computed 
analogously. In Appendix C, I describe how observed and predicted product shares 
are used in estimation.
B. supply
In this subsection, I derive a supply equation that approximates airlines’ optimiz-
ing behavior for each type of product supplied (codeshare and online). To the best 
of my knowledge, this paper constitutes the first attempt to use a structural econo-
metric model designed to explicitly capture the optimizing behavior to supply code-
share products.6 In the spirit of Villas-Boas (2007 and 2009); Bonnet, Dubois, and 
Villas-Boas (forthcoming); Bonnet, Dubois, and Simioni (2006); and Bonnet and 
5 I use 200 random draws from F( ⋅ ) for the numerical approximation of  d jt ( ⋅ ) .
6 Armantier and Richard (2008) use a structural econometric model to analyze the consumer welfare con-
sequences of codeshare alliances. However, their model focuses on the demand side of the market and does not 
explicitly considers the optimizing behavior of airlines in supplying codeshare products.
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Dubois (2010), behavioral equations are derived that express price-cost margins as 
a function of demand parameters.
codeshare Products.—We may think of a codeshare agreement as a privately 
negotiated pricing contract between partners (s, ϒ), where s is a per-passenger 
price the ticketing carrier pays to a pure operating carrier for its services needed to 
 complete the trip, while ϒ represents a potential fixed transfer between the partners 
that determines how the joint surplus is distributed. In what follows, only the level 
of s affects equilibrium final product prices. The equilibrium value of ϒ depends on 
specific assumptions about the bargaining process. However, for purposes of this 
paper I am not concerned how the surplus is distributed between partners through 
the fixed transfer ϒ.
The modeling approach described above is a simplification of codeshare agree-
ments since airlines may actually use more complicated mechanisms to compensate 
each other on codeshare flights. While some information is available on compensa-
tion mechanisms used between major carriers and their regional feeder partners (see 
Forbes and Lederman 2013), the focus of the present paper is codesharing between 
major carriers. Specific codeshare compensation mechanisms between major partner 
airlines are not usually made known to the public, and may even vary across partner-
ships. The extent of what is commonly known is that the ticketing carrier markets 
and sets the final price for the round-trip ticket, and compensates the pure operating 
carrier for operating services provided on complementary trip segments. Therefore, 
the simplistic modeling approach of using  ( s, ϒ ) to represent a codeshare contract 
captures our basic understanding of what is commonly known without imposing too 
much structure on a contracting process about which we have few facts.
To obtain an empirical model that allows for double marginalization, I assume 
that the prices of codeshare products are determined within a sequential price-set-
ting game. In this game the upstream carrier (pure operating carrier) first sets the 
price for its segment of the trip, s, then the downstream carrier (ticketing carrier) 
sets the final round-trip price, p, given the agreed-upon price for the services sup-
plied by an upstream carrier. To solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
in sequential games, it is standard to start by looking at the final subgame in the 
sequential game. The final subgame in this vertical model is a Bertrand-Nash game 
between downstream carriers.
In what follows, I suppress the market index t only to avoid a clutter of subscripts. 
Therefore, when I specify an airline’s profit function, it represents the airline’s profit 
only in market t.
Let r = 1, … , r index ticketing carriers that compete in a downstream market, 
and let f = 1, … , F index the corresponding upstream carriers. Further, let   r be 
a subset of the J codeshare products that are offered for sale by ticketing carrier 
r. Thus, carriers are allowed to offer multiple products for sale. Ticketing carrier r 
solves the following optimization problem:
(3)  max 
p j 
  {  ∑ j∈  r  
 
 ( p j −  s j f −  c j r )M ⋅  d j (p) } , 
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where  d j (p) is the predicted market share function for product j ; p represents a vec-
tor of final prices;  c j r is the constant marginal cost carrier r incurs in providing the 
services necessary to offer product j ; and as defined previously,  s j f is the price the 
ticketing carrier pays to pure operating carrier f for its services needed to complete 
the trip.
The first-order conditions generated from the optimization problem in (3) are a 
set of J equations, one for each product. Following expositions in Nevo (2000b) and 
Villas-Boas (2007), the set of J first-order conditions imply the following product 
markup equation expressed in matrix notation:
(4) p −  s f −  c r =  − ( Ω r ×  Δ r ) −1 d(p), 
where d( ⋅ ), p,  s f , and  c r are J × 1 vectors of product shares, final prices, upstream 
carriers’ prices, and downstream carriers’ marginal costs, respectively;  Ω r is a J × J 
matrix of appropriately positioned zeros and ones based on the ticketing carriers’ 
ownership structure of the J products;  Δ r is a J × J matrix of first-order derivatives 
of predicted product shares with respect to final prices; and  Ω r ×  Δ r is an element-
by-element multiplication of the two matrices.
Having characterized the price-cost markup behavior of downstream carriers, as 
captured by equation (4), I now turn to the problem of the upstream carriers. Let 
 f be a subset of the J products to which carrier f supply pure operating services. 
Again, I allow carriers to offer pure operating services to multiple products. Given 
that final prices are a function of upstream prices via equation (4), then predicted 
product shares are also a function of upstream prices:  d j ( p ( s f ) ) .
Knowing that ticketing carriers behave according to equation (4), each upstream 
carrier solves the following problem:
(5)  max 
 s  j f
   {  ∑ j∈  f  
 
 ( s j f −  c  j f )M ⋅  d j (p ( s  f   ) ) } , 
where  c j f is the marginal cost that carrier f incurs when providing pure operating 
services to product j. The system of J first-order conditions generated from the 
optimization problem in (5) imply the following markup equation:
(6)  s f −  c f =  − ( Ω f ×  Δ f ) −1 d(p), 
where  c f is a J × 1 vector of pure operating carriers’ marginal cost;  Ω f is a J × J 
matrix of appropriately positioned zeros and ones based on upstream carriers’ 
ownership structure of the J products; and  Δ f is a J × J matrix of derivatives of 
predicted product shares with respect to upstream carrier prices. In Appendix B I 
discuss how  Δ f is computed. Note that  Ω f ≠  Ω r , since subsets of the J competing 
products owned by ticketing and pure operating carriers may differ.
Finally, to derive an expression for the overall price-cost margin for codeshare 
products, I sum equations (4) and (6), which yields:
(7) p −  c r −  c f =  − ( Ω r ×  Δ r ) −1 d(p) −  ( Ω f ×  Δ f ) −1 d(p).
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Note that equation (7) has the useful property that estimation of overall price-
cost margins does not require information on prices that pure operating carriers 
charge their partner ticketing carrier, i.e., the researcher does not need to know  s f . 
This property is useful since data on the prices that airlines use as a basis for trading 
services among themselves are difficult to obtain.
online Products.—In presenting the vertical pricing model above, it is implicitly 
assumed that all J products in the market are supplied using a codeshare struc-
ture. However, in a more realistic setting a subset of the J products are likely to be 
online products. This can be captured in the model above by assuming that online 
products represent cases where the downstream and upstream carriers are vertically 
integrated. Such vertical integration serves to eliminate the upstream markup and 
therefore  s k f =  c k f for any online product k. As such, in modifying the supply model 
to capture cases where some products are online, the downstream markup equation 
(equation (4)) is unchanged and apply to all products, while the new upstream equa-
tion for codeshare products is
(8)  s f −  c f =  − ( Ω f code ×  Δ f code ) −1 d(p ) code , 
where  Ω f code and  Δ f code are square matrices containing the rows and columns of  Ω f 
and  Δ f that correspond to codeshare products, and d(p ) code is a vector containing 
predicted market shares of codeshare products in d(p). Thus, the overall price-cost 
margin for each codeshare product is given by the upstream markup, captured in 
equation (8), plus the corresponding downstream markup, captured by equation (4), 
while online products only have a downstream markup.
A Unified supply Equation.—Let  m d and  m u be J × 1 vectors containing down-
stream and upstream margins, respectively. Note that the margin functions depend 
on prices and demand parameters:   m d (p; α, β, σ) and  m u (p; α, β, σ). However, in 
much of what follows I simply use  m d and  m u only for notational convenience. For 
example, overall price-cost margins in a market containing both types of products 
are given by
(9) p −  c T =  m d +  m u , 
where  c T is a J × 1 vector containing aggregate marginal costs for supplying each 
product. Equation (9) can also be expressed as
(10) p =  c T +  m d +  m u .
Alternate supply Equation specifications.—Let the marginal cost function be 
specified as
(11)  c T = exp ( Wγ + ψ ) , 
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where W is a vector of variables that shift marginal cost (itinerary distance, itiner-
ary distance squared, time dummies, jet fuel price interacted with operating car-
rier dummies); γ is a vector of estimable parameters in the marginal cost function; 
and ψ is the portion of marginal cost that is unobserved by the researcher, which 
I assume to be a random term with zero mean. The specification of the marginal 
cost function in equation (11) is admittedly simplistic since it does not allow for 
endogenous aspects of airlines costs such as density economies. However, a more 
general specification that allows for density economies will make post-estimation 
counterfactual analysis infeasible. As such, following Berry and Jia (2010), I chose 
to use a restrictive specification of marginal cost that buys me the benefit of being 
able to use the estimated model for counterfactual simulations.
As previously defined, a codeshare product and the upstream carrier of the code-
share product is considered “integrated” if the upstream carrier simultaneously 
offers competing online product(s) in the same market, otherwise the codeshare 
product and the upstream carrier are considered as “unintegrated.” Based on the-
oretical predictions in Chen and Gayle (2007), optimal price-setting behavior of 
codeshare partners will eliminate the upstream margin for unintegrated products, 
but not eliminate the upstream margin for integrated codeshare products. Therefore, 
based on equations (10) and (11), the true parametric supply equation specification, 
which I define as Model 1, is given by
(12) Model 1: p = exp ( Wγ + ψ ) +  m d 1 +  m u 1,
where the positive elements in the J × 1 vector  m u 1 are for integrated codeshare 
products, while the remaining elements are zeros for online and unintegrated code-
share products. In other words, Model 1 allows an upstream margin only for inte-
grated codeshare products.
In the event that codeshare partners’ optimal price-setting behavior is consistent 
with predictions in Chen and Gayle (2007), then Model 1 should provide a better 
statistical fit of the data compared to the following alternate specifications:
(13) Model 2: p = exp ( Wγ + ψ ) +  m d 2 +  m u 2,
(14) Model 3: p = exp ( Wγ + ψ ) +  m d 3,
(15) Model 4: p = exp ( Wγ + ψ ) +  m d 4 +  m u 4.
Model 2 assumes the upstream margin is not eliminated from codeshare products, 
whether they be of the integrated type or not. As such, the positive elements in the 
J × 1 vector  m u 2 are for all codeshare products, while the remaining elements are 
zeros for online products. Model 3 assumes that the upstream margin is eliminated 
for both integrated and unintegrated codeshare products, therefore no upstream mar-
gin term is needed in this specification. Last, Model 4 assumes an upstream margin 
exists only for unintegrated codeshare products, i.e., the positive elements in the 
J × 1 vector  m u 4 are for unintegrated codeshare products, while the remaining ele-
ments are zeros for online and integrated codeshare products.
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In what follows, I jointly estimate demand and marginal cost parameters under 
each alternate supply equation specification and use nonnested statistical tests based 
on Rivers and Vuong (2002) and Smith (1992) to see which specification best fits 
the data.7 One reason I estimate the demand parameters jointly with marginal cost 
parameters is that Gayle (2007a) shows, in the case of airline data, information from 
the supply side of the market significantly helps in obtaining demand parameter 
estimates that are consistent with static profit maximization. In the case of the auto-
mobile industry, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) also find that joint estimation 
of demand and supply sides of the model significantly improves demand estimates.
IV. Estimation
The demand and marginal cost parameters are estimated jointly using Generalized 
Methods of Moments (GMM). Estimation details are provided in Appendix C.
Since it is reasonable to assume that airlines take into account changes in unob-
served (to the researcher) product quality, ξ jt , when setting prices, then prices will 
depend on ξ jt . As such, the estimated coefficient on price will be inconsistent if 
appropriate instruments are not found for prices. Following much of the literature 
on discrete choice models of demand, one identifying assumption I make is that 
observed nonprice product characteristics in  x jt are uncorrelated with changes in 
the unobserved product quality, ξ jt . Since airline dummy variables are included in 
the mean utility function, it is only changes in the portion of product quality not 
specific to airlines that is captured in ξ jt . Hence, this identifying assumption seems 
reasonable.8
Similar to Villas-Boas (2007), I also exploit the time dimension of the data to 
construct instruments for airline ticket price in the demand equation. In particular, I 
observe variations in jet fuel price over the time span of the data, and therefore make 
the identifying assumption that changes in jet fuel price is likely to affect airlines’ 
marginal cost differently. The reason for the assumed differential effect on marginal 
cost is that airlines differ in their route network structure and size distribution of 
their aircraft fleet. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that airlines do not rou-
tinely change their aircraft fleet with each change in jet fuel price. As such, airlines 
are likely to differ in the intensity with which they use fuel. Given that an airline’s 
marginal cost is correlated with its price, and I assume that shocks to fuel price are 
uncorrelated with  ξ jt , then the interaction of fuel price with operating carrier(s) dum-
mies are valid instruments for airline ticket price. In addition, since the marginal 
cost of servicing an itinerary is assumed to be a positive function of itinerary dis-
tance, itinerary distance is also used as an instrument for airline ticket price.
In summary, the demand instruments include: (i)  interaction of fuel price with 
operating carrier(s) dummies; (ii) itinerary distance; (iii) the squared deviation 
of a product’s itinerary distance from the average itinerary distance of competing 
7 Since demand and marginal cost parameters are jointly estimated, the pair of estimated margins ( m d and  m u ) 
are different under each alternate supply equation specification, as such, the competing estimated supply equations 
are not nested.
8 See Berry and Jia (2010); Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006); Nevo (2000a); Villas-Boas (2007); and Goldberg 
and Verboven (2001) for similar identifying assumptions.
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products offered by other airlines; and (iv) an airline’s market mean itinerary 
 inconvenient measure, i.e., market mean, by airline, of the variable “Inconvenient”—a 
nonprice product characteristic measure previously discussed in the data section.9 
All these instruments are motivated by supply theory, which predicts that equilib-
rium price is affected by changes in marginal cost and changes in markup.
Instruments (iii) and (iv) are assumed to influence the size of an airline’s markup 
on each of its products. Instrument (iii) is a measure of how closely substitutable an 
airline’s product is relative to its competitors’ products. The smaller is the deviation 
of a product’s itinerary distance from other products in the same market, the closer 
a substitute the product is for competing products, and the smaller is the markup 
that an airline is able to charge on the product. Instrument (iv) captures the average 
convenience of flight itineraries offered by an airline in the relevant market. The 
greater is the airline’s mean itinerary inconvenient measure, the lower is the markup 
the airline is able to charge on products, ceteris paribus.
Even though it is reasonable and correct to argue that instruments (iii) and (iv) 
are strategic choices of an airline and therefore they are not strictly exogenous, their 
validity relies on the assumption that these strategic choices are made prior to the 
realization of unobserved shocks to demand or marginal cost,  ( ξ jt ,  ψ jt ) . This is an 
admittedly strong assumption, but it is typical in the literature as better alternatives 
are difficult to find.
Recall that the error term in the supply equation, ψ jt , captures unobserved (by 
the researcher) determinants of marginal cost, which in turn influences equilibrium 
prices. As such, the margin terms,  m djt and  m ujt , are likely to be correlated with ψ jt in 
the supply equation. Based on the discussion of the validity of instruments used in 
the demand equation, instruments (iii) and (iv) above are also valid for the supply 
equation.10
V. Results
I begin by estimating a standard logit specification of the demand model, which 
is more restrictive than the demand model outlined previously in the sense that the 
standard logit does not allow marginal utilities for product characteristics to vary 
across consumers. Estimates from the standard logit specification are not reported 
here but are available upon request. The estimates reveal significant difference in 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) price coefficient estimate compared to the two-
stage least squares (2SLS) price coefficient estimate, which is suggestive that the 
endogeneity of price indeed results in severe bias of the price coefficient estimate 
if instruments are not used for price. The Wu-Hausman test easily rejects that price 
is exogenous at conventional levels of significance. First-stage regression estimates, 
also available upon request, in which price is regressed on the instruments has 
r2 = 0.28. An F-test of the joint statistical significance of the instruments in the 
first-stage regression yields: F(30, 3871) = 14.12; and a p-value for the F-statistic 
9 Interactions of some of these variables are also included as instruments.
10 Since itinerary distance is included in the marginal cost function, it cannot instrument for the margin terms 
in the supply equation.
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of 0.000, which suggest that the instruments do have explanatory power of varia-
tions in price.
I now focus the remainder of the discussion on estimates from the less restrictive 
random coefficients logit demand model. Table 3 reports both demand and marginal 
cost parameter estimates under each of the alternate supply equation specifications 
(Model 1; Model 2; Model 3; and Model 4 ) previously discussed. The upper panel 
of the table reports the mean marginal (dis)utility for each product characteristic 
(α and β), while the panel immediately below this upper panel reports the param-
eter estimates that measure variation in taste for each product characteristic (σ). As 
expected, the price coefficient estimate suggest that, on average, passengers are less 
likely to choose a flight itinerary the higher its price, ceteris paribus.
It has been suggested that owing to frequent-flyer programs, hub airlines might 
have more brand-loyal customers at their hub airports (Berry, Carnall, and Spiller 
2006). In addition, airlines tend to offer more convenient flight itineraries and more 
flight options out of their hub airports.11 These arguments are consistent with the 
positive coefficient on “Hub” even though here it is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels of significance.
The coefficient on “Inconvenient” is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels of significance, but as expected and suggested by its negative sign, passengers 
seem to prefer itineraries that are more convenient and use a less circuitous route in 
traveling from the origin to destination city (Gayle 2007a). The coefficient on the 
interaction between “Inconvenient” and “Hub” is negative as expected. The negative 
coefficient on this interaction variable suggests that the marginal disutility associ-
ated with itinerary inconvenience is greater for hub products compared to nonhub 
products. A plausible interpretation of this result is that passengers expect hub prod-
ucts to have convenient routing, and thus these products are more heavily penalized 
relative to nonhub products for not having convenient routing.
The coefficient on the codeshare dummy is not statistically significant at con-
ventional levels of statistical significance, but its consistent negative sign across 
all specifications suggests that passengers may perceive traditional codeshare prod-
ucts as an inferior substitute to online products. Since a codeshare product requires 
that the passenger changes airlines on a given trip, one explanation for this choice 
behavior of passengers is that partner airlines have not been able to make passengers 
transition across airlines seamless, thus resulting in traditional codeshare products’ 
being inferior substitutes for online products.
The coefficients on the time period dummies do suggest the presence of seasonal-
ity in air travel demand. In particular, air travel demand seems to be highest in spring 
and summer, which accords with our expectations.
The taste variation parameters that are statistically significant at conventional 
 levels of significance suggest that passengers are heterogenous, with respect to their 
taste, for these measured product characteristics in the model. This result provides 
reassurance that the less restrictive random coefficients logit model is likely a more 
accurate description of air travel demand compared to the standard logit model.
11 For more discussion on airlines market power and demand advantages at their hub airports see Borenstein 
(1989, 1991); Berry (1990); Evans and Kessides (1993); and Lederman (2007).
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The demand parameter estimates across the four alternate models in Table 3 
yield a mean own-price elasticity of demand of −4.72. Peters (2006) found mean 
 own-price elasticity estimates ranging from −3.2 to −4.0 depending on the type 
of discrete choice demand model used (nested logit or generalized extreme value 
(GEV)). One possible reason the estimated own-price elasticities in this paper is on 
the higher end of the spectrum is because the data sample likely contain a higher 
proportion of traditional codeshare products compared to data samples in most other 
airline studies. Recall that in the data section I stated that a criterion for a market to 
remain in the final sample is that it contains at least ten products with at least one of 
these products being a traditional codeshare product. Since traditional  codesharing 
Table 3—Estimates from Joint Estimation of Demand and Marginal Cost Parameters, when Demand 
Is Based on the Random Coefficients Logit Specification
Supply equation allows 
upstream margin only 





margin on all 
codeshare products
(Model 2)
Supply equation does 
not allow upstream mar-
gin on any codeshare 
product
(Model 3)
Supply equation allows 





















Constant −6.438** 0.9864 −6.467** 1.0800 −6.442** 1.0450 −6.451** 0.9830
Price (Thousands, $) −26.377** 7.2138 −25.920** 7.6184 −26.236** 7.5331 −26.406** 7.2360
Hub 2.294 1.7469 2.277 1.6991 2.252 1.7219 2.284 1.7468
Inconvenient −0.696 0.9375 −0.690 1.0574 −0.685 0.9930 −0.663 0.9165
Hub  ×  Inconvenient −2.030** 0.9138 −2.092** 0.9453 −2.069** 0.9387 −2.028** 0.9147
Codeshare −4.215 2.7307 −3.773 2.9083 −3.908 2.8419 −4.274 2.6996
Quarter 1—Winter −0.150* 0.0899 −0.150* 0.0899 −0.151* 0.0899 −0.149* 0.0898
Quarter 2—Spring 0.277** 0.0899 0.272** 0.0903 0.273** 0.0897 0.278** 0.0900
Quarter 3—Summer 0.305** 0.0914 0.309** 0.0926 0.306** 0.0921 0.305** 0.0917
Taste variation, (σ)
Constant −0.238 0.7888 −0.083 0.9108 −0.157 0.8609 −0.237 0.7841
Price (thousands, $) −5.349* 2.7591 −5.221* 3.0191 −5.325* 2.9198 −5.351* 2.7601
Hub 1.243 1.1987 1.312 1.1690 1.315 1.1800 1.252 1.1940
Inconvenient 0.897* 0.5015 0.883 0.5699 0.884* 0.5349 0.879* 0.4993
Codeshare −2.745** 1.3651 −2.515* 1.4858 −2.588* 1.4451 −2.773** 1.3436
Marginal cost, (γ)
Constant −2.035** 0.0925 −2.017** 0.0921 −1.982** 0.0812 −1.961** 0.0781
Itinerary distance 0.984 0.6721 0.776 0.6876 0.635 0.6075 0.458 0.6221
(Itinerary distance)2 1.640 1.5071 2.136 1.5743 2.253 1.4125 2.661* 1.4823
Quarter 1—Winter −0.027** 0.0116 −0.031** 0.0121 −0.034** 0.0112 −0.037** 0.0115
Quarter 2—Spring 0.075** 0.0127 0.077** 0.0127 0.064** 0.0115 0.066** 0.0116
Quarter 3—Summer 0.068** 0.0144 0.069** 0.0145 0.055** 0.0125 0.055** 0.0126
Value of GMM objective
 from joint estimation
0.0738196 0.0738448 0.0738362 0.0738804
Post−estimation 
computation of GMM 
objective function 
value for supply 
equation
0.0045 0.0046 0.0056 0.0053
Notes: Ticketing carrier dummy variables are included in the demand model even though these coefficient estimates 
are not reported. Similarly, the interactions of jet fuel price with operating carrier(s) dummies are included in the 
marginal cost function even though these coefficient estimates are not reported.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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tends to lower prices,12 it is reasonable to conjecture that competition may be stiffer, 
markups lower, and own-price elasticities higher, in markets with a higher preva-
lence of traditional codeshare products.
The positive coefficient on itinerary distance suggests that marginal cost may be 
increasing in itinerary distance, but the distance coefficients are estimated with some 
noise. However, the robustly estimated coefficients on the seasonal dummies in the 
marginal cost equation suggest that marginal cost of providing air travel is highest in 
spring and summer. These marginal cost parameter estimates accord with what we 
would expect since longer travel distances require more fuel, and with peak travel 
season being in the summer, fuel price is likely to be highest at that time of year.
A. statistical Nonnested Tests for Model selection
While the qualitative results across the four alternate model specifications are 
similar, as suggested by the coefficient estimates in Table 3, we have not yet resolved 
which specification provides the best statistical fit of the data. For this analysis I rely 
on a nonnested statistical test in Rivers and Vuong (2002) and Smith (1992).13
The test statistic used to statistically compare the alternate supply specifications 
is given by




  w 
  [GM M i − GM M j ],  for i ≠ j,
where GM M i is the value of the GMM objective function for supply Model i ; GM M j 
is the value of the GMM objective function for supply Model j; and   w is an estimate 
of the standard error of the difference in the GMM objective function value of supply 
Model i and supply Model j. The last row of Table 3 reports post-estimation compu-
tation of the GMM objective function value for each of the alternate supply equation 
specifications. Test statistic T is normally distributed. The null hypothesis is that the 
two models being compared by the test are asymptotically equivalent. As such, for 
this one tail test at a 5 percent level of significance, T > 1.64 implies that supply 
Model i is statistically inferior to supply Model j (for i ≠ j and i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4 ), 
T <  −1.64 implies that supply Model j is statistically inferior to supply Model i, 
while  −1.64 < T < 1.64 implies that we cannot statistically distinguish between 
the two models being compared.
Table 4 reports computed values for test statistic T for pairwise comparisons of 
the alternate supply specifications. The computed values in the table reveal that sup-
ply Models 1 and 2 each statistically fit the data better when compared to supply 
Model 3, i.e., where T = 10.79 and T = 13.99, respectively, in Table 4. In other 
words, the evidence suggest that a supply model which eliminates upstream margin 
on codeshare products is statistically inferior to supply models that allow upstream 
12 See Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2011); Brueckner and Proost (2010); Ito and Lee (2007); Brueckner and 
Whalen, (2000); Brueckner (2001); Brueckner (2003).
13 This nonnested test is also used by Bonnet, Dubois, and Villas-Boas (forthcoming) and Villas-Boas (2007) 
for supply model selection, similar to how I am using the test.
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margin on these products. The positive nonnested test statistic value in the table 
when comparing supply Models 1 and 2 suggests that Model 1 may better fit the 
data compared to Model 2. However, since the actual test statistic value, T = 0.70, 
is less than 1.64, this suggests that the “margin” of superiority of Model 1 over 2 is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance.
Recall that the vast majority of codeshare products (81.41 percent in the sample) 
are of the integrated type. Therefore, it is possible that the sample split between inte-
grated and unintegrated codeshare products is not sufficiently equitable to generate 
enough statistical power to distinguish between supply Models 1 and 2. Fortunately, 
we can still get at the issue of which type of codeshare product is more likely to have 
an upstream margin. To assess this issue I use the nonnested test to compare sup-
ply Models 1 and 4, i.e., I compare a supply model that allows an upstream margin 
only on integrated codeshare products (Model 1) to a supply model that allows an 
upstream margin only on unintegrated codeshare products (Model 4). The value of 
the nonnested test statistic when Models 1 and 4 are compared is T = 8.69, suggest-
ing that the supply model which allows an upstream margin only on integrated code-
share products is statistically superior to a supply model that allows an upstream 
margin only on unintegrated codeshare products.
In summary, results from the nonnested statistical tests are consistent with what 
is theoretically predicted in Chen and Gayle (2007). The idea is that the strategic 
incentives of an upstream/pure operating carrier of a traditional codeshare product 
who also offers its own online product in the said market (integrated upstream car-
rier) is likely to differ from an upstream carrier that does not offer its own competing 
online product (unintegrated upstream carrier). Specifically, the integrated upstream 
carrier optimally chooses not to eliminate its margin for its codeshare products. A 
reason for such strategic behavior by the integrated upstream carrier is that by rais-
ing the price of its trip segment (the intermediate good price), this carrier is able to 
reduce the intensity of downstream competition for its own online product. As such, 
even when codeshare partners negotiate a pricing contract that maximizes their joint 
Table 4—Nonnested Tests for Model Selection
Model 1: Supply equation 
allows upstream margin only on 
integrated codeshare products
Model 3: Supply equation does 
not allow upstream margin on 
any codeshare product
Model 2: Supply equation allows 
upstream margin on all codeshare 
products
T =   w−1 √ _ n[ GM M 2 − GM M 1 ] 
= 0.70
T =   w−1 √ _ n[ GM M 3 − GM M 2 ] 
= 13.99
Model 3: Supply equation does 
not allow upstream margin on any 
codeshare product
T =   w−1 √ _ n[ GM M 3 − GM M 1 ] 
= 10.79
—
Model 4: Supply equation allows 
upstream margin only on unintegrated 
codeshare products
T =   w−1 √ _ n[ GM M 4 − GM M 1 ] 
= 8.69
—
Notes: Table reports values of the nonnested test statistic T =   w−1 √ _ n[ GM M i − GM M j ] for the pair wise com-
parisons of respective supply models. The test statistic is normally distributed. As such, for these one tale tests 
at a 5 percent level of significance, if T > 1.64 supply Model i is statistically inferior to supply Model j(for i ≠ j 
and i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4); while if T < −1.64, then supply Model j is statistically inferior to supply Model i. Last, 
if  −1.64 < T < 1.64, then supply Models i and j are statistically indistinguishable.
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profit, the equilibrium contract may not eliminate the upstream margin due to the 
upstream carrier’s concern for the profitability of its own competing online product.
B. Margins and recovered Marginal cost Estimates
Summary statistics on price-cost margins and recovered marginal costs for inte-
grated codeshare products are reported in Table 5.14 These statistics are broken down 
by ticketing carriers/downstream carriers of the integrated codeshare products, but 
the last row in the table reports overall summaries of these statistics across carriers. 
Note that all computed price-cost margins and recovered marginal cost estimates are 
statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance.
First, I focus on the last row in the table, which gives an overall picture of mar-
gins and recovered marginal costs. This row shows that mean margins for down-
stream and upstream carriers are $47.34 and $45.38, respectively, yielding a mean 
total margin (upstream plus downstream) of $92.72. On average, total margin is 
39.22 percent of final product price. The ratio of margin to price is referred to as 
14 Price-cost margins are computed using  m d 1(p;   α ,   β ,   σ ) and  m u 1(p;   α ,   β ,   σ ), while marginal costs are recov-
ered using  ̂  c T = p −  m d 1(p;   α ,   β ,   σ ) −  m u 1(p;   α ,   β ,   σ ). The parameter estimates,   α ,   β , and   σ are set equal to their 
values reported in the first column of Table 3.
Table 5—Price-Cost Margins and Recovered Marginal Cost, by Airline,  





































































































































































Notes: The airline listed in a given row in the table is the ticketing carrier/downstream carrier for the integrated 
codeshare products used for computing the respective statistics in that row. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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the Lerner Index. Therefore, the estimated Lerner Index for integrated codeshare 
products is approximately 0.39. Considering all types of air travel products, Berry 
and Jia (2010) find Lerner Index estimates ranging from 0.41 to 0.60, depending on 
model specification. As such, my Lerner Index estimates are within the “ballpark” 
of the estimates reported in Berry and Jia (2010).
Mean marginal cost is $154.31. On average, marginal cost comprises 60.78 per-
cent of final product price. With the mean itinerary distance for codeshare products 
in the sample being 2,369.46 miles, and mean marginal cost estimate being $154.31, 
the implied marginal cost per mile is about 6 cents. This 6 cents marginal cost per 
mile estimate is exactly what Berry and Jia (2010) find using their econometric 
model.15 It is reassuring that the econometric model in this paper generates esti-
mates that are consistent with previous research.
Now for comparing the computed price-cost margins and recovered marginal cost 
estimates across ticketing carriers/downstream carriers of the integrated codeshare 
products. First, as expected, Southwest Airlines being a formidable low-cost-carrier 
(LCC) offers products for sale with the lowest mean total margin ($87.28), and by 
far the lowest mean marginal cost ($117.95). Even though the products offered by 
Southwest have total margins as a percent of price being the highest (42.87 percent) 
compared to other carriers, as we will see in the next table, this is primarily driven 
by Southwest having the lowest mean price. It is noted that Southwest offers the 
least number of integrated codeshare products (43) compared to other carriers. This 
is not surprising however since strategic alliances between US domestic airlines are 
predominantly formed between the traditional network carriers rather than between 
LCCs.
By contrast, United Airlines and US Airways seem to offer products with the 
highest total margins, $94.97 and $94.57, respectively. Interestingly, these two car-
riers are alliance partners, so the vast majority of the codeshare products offered 
by each of them will have the other as the partner carrier. Not surprisingly, United 
Airlines, US Airways, and American Airlines, being traditional network carriers, 
offer products that have the highest marginal cost compared to products offered by 
other carriers.
C. counterfactual simulations
I now use the model to perform counterfactual simulations that reveal how equi-
librium prices, number of passengers, and consumer welfare are affected if inte-
grated codeshare products were efficiently priced. In other words, if I artificially 
eliminate the upstream margin for integrated codeshare products in the sample, what 
is the model’s prediction of changes in equilibrium prices, number of passengers, 
and consumer surplus?16 The purpose of the simulations is to measure market effects 
relative to a scenario where double marginalization did not persist for these  products. 
However, other alternate scenarios are possible and could be simulated and studied.
15 See final paragraph on page 25 in Berry and Jia (2010).
16 The counterfactual simulation procedure I outline below is similar in spirit to procedures in Villas-Boas 
(2009).
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First, I recover product-level marginal cost by rearranging the supply equation as 
follows:
(17)  ̂  c T = p −  m d 1(p;   α ,   β ,   σ ) −  m u 1(p;   α ,   β ,   σ ), 
where  ̂  c T is a vector containing estimates of aggregate marginal costs for supplying 
each product; p is a vector of actual prices from the dataset; while  m d 1(⋅) and  m u 1(⋅) 
are the respective downstream and upstream markup functions. In equation (17), 
all parameters (  α ,   β ,   σ ) are set equal to their estimated values in the first column of 
Table 3. Using the previously recovered  ̂  c T , I then solve the following counterfactual 
nonlinear supply equation for a new equilibrium price vector,  p ∗ , i.e., I compute the 
p ∗ that satisfy
(18)  p ∗ −  ̂  c T −  m d 1 ( p ∗ ;   α ,   β ,   σ ) = 0.
A comparison of p with  p ∗ reveals how equilibrium price would be affected if inte-
grated codeshare products are efficiently priced.
It must be noted, however, that the counterfactual experiment outlined above 
assumes that when counterfactual supply equation (18) is used to characterize firms’ 
optimal pricing behavior, the existing menu of products offered in a market stays 
the same. As stated previously, the empirical model in this paper assumes that firms’ 
choice of whether to form a codeshare alliance is predetermined at the time of opti-
mal price-setting behavior. In a more general model in which codeshare alliance 
formation is endogenous, it is possible that some firms may optimally choose not to 
form an alliance if policymakers could effectively enforce efficient pricing of inte-
grated codeshare products. In other words, the equilibrium menu of products in the 
market if firms could be forced to behave according to equation (18) may be differ-
ent than the equilibrium menu of products without such restrictions.
Another caveat of the counterfactual experiment worth pointing out lies in a strong 
assumption of the model that constant returns to scale can accurately approximate 
the production of air travel service over the range of passenger volumes observed in 
the data. The concern is as follows. In the event that the simulation exercise gener-
ate large predicted changes in passenger volumes, it is likely that constant returns to 
scale yields less accurate approximations of costs, which would therefore decrease 
the accuracy of simulated effects. Second, for simplicity the model abstracts from 
capacity constraints, but such constraints may be binding for some airlines, which 
would also decrease the accuracy of simulated effects.
Table 6 reports predicted percent changes in price and number of passengers of 
integrated codeshare products if upstream margin is eliminated from these products. 
The data in the table are reported by ticketing carrier of the codeshare products 
offered, as well as overall effects across carriers. Mean predicted percent changes 
are all statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance. I 
begin by focussing on the overall effects reported in the last row of the table.
Across all carriers and markets, the mean price of integrated codeshare products 
is $247.04, while the mean number of passengers that use one of these  products 
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during a quarter in an origin-destination market is 23.45. Efficient pricing of these 
products will result in a fall in their prices by a mean 19.86 percent, but a far more 
substantial mean increase of 174.27 percent in the number of passengers that use 
a typical integrated codeshare product in an origin-destination market during a 
quarter.
Now for comparing across airlines. We see that Southwest Airlines has the low-
est mean price ($205.23), as well as the largest mean predicted percent reduction 
in the price of its integrated codeshare products (−21.87 percent). In addition, 
even though Southwest offers the fewest number of integrated codeshare products 
(43), this carrier has the largest mean number of passengers (47.75) traveling on 
its typical integrated codeshare product, and is predicted to experience the largest 
percent increase in the number of its passengers on these products (176.87 percent) 
if the products did not have double markup. By contrast, American Airlines and 
US Airways offer the most expensive integrated codeshare products, mean price 
of $263.35 and $266.79, respectively, and are predicted to experience the smallest 
mean percent declines in prices of these products, −18.47 percent and −18.66 per-
cent, respectively.
Further analysis reveals that predicted percent changes in price and number of 
passengers do not vary much by market nonstop flight distance or market origin city 
population (a measure of market size).
Table 6—Mean Initial Levels and Predicted Percent Changes in Price and Number of Passengers, by 


























































Notes: The airline listed in a given row in the table is the ticketing carrier/downstream carrier for the integrated 
codeshare products used for computing the respective statistics in that row. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Next, I explore the extent to which consumer welfare is affected by the price-
quantity changes that are associated with efficient pricing of integrated codeshare 
products.
In the case of the logit model, a measure of consumer surplus for consumer i is 
given by (see Nevo 2000b; McFadden 1981; Small and Rosen 1981; Train 2003)
 c s i =  
1 _  α i  ln  [ ∑ j=0
J
  e  V ij  ] ,
where  α i is the random coefficient on price in equation (1) and  V ij =   δ jt + μ ijt from 
equation (2). Therefore, a measure of the change in consumer surplus for consumer 
i due to efficient pricing of integrated codeshare products is given by
(19) Δc s i =  
ln  [  ∑ 
j=0
J
  e  V ij 
∗
 ] − ln  [  ∑ 
j=0
J
  e  V ij  ] 
   __  α i   ,
where  V ij ∗ and  V ij are evaluated at  p ∗ and p, respectively. The change in expected 
consumer surplus for an entire origin-destination market is given by




 Δc s i dF(ν), 
where M is the size of the origin city population, and F( ⋅ ) is the standard normal 
distribution function as previously defined.
My analyses reveal that, over the course of a year, the mean level of consumer sur-
plus for an origin-destination market is $498,026, but efficient pricing of integrated 
codeshare products in these markets is predicted to increase consumer surplus by a 
mean 7.37 percent. The largest predicted percent increase in annual consumer sur-
plus is a mean 11.69 percent across origin-destination markets that have origin city 
population equal to or less than 362,470 people. However, compared to other mar-
kets, these markets have the lowest mean level of consumer surplus, $294,756.40. 
Markets with origin city population larger than 1,223,400 people have the second 
largest predicted percent increase, a mean 7.99 percent, but unlike small population 
markets, large population markets have relatively large mean consumer surplus of 
$494,821.10.
Markets with nonstop flight distance equal to or less than 1,754 miles have the 
largest mean level consumer surplus of $913,597.50, but these markets are pre-
dicted to have the smallest mean percent increase in consumer surplus, 2.69 percent. 
Markets with nonstop flight distances between 1,754 and 2,412 miles are predicted 
to have the largest percent increases in consumer surplus (approximately 9 percent). 
However, the level of consumer surplus in these markets is relatively small, typically 
below $370,000.
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VI. Conclusion
Using a structural econometric model, this paper investigates whether the 
upstream markup of integrated codeshare products is eliminated when codeshare 
partners optimally price these products. I define integrated codeshare products as 
traditional codeshare products for which the pure operating carrier also offers its 
own competing online product in the said market. The econometric estimates sug-
gest that the upstream markup is not eliminated for these products. This result is 
consistent with theoretical predictions in Chen and Gayle (2007), and also has links 
to the literature on vertical integration. An intuitive explanation that the theoreti-
cal literature suggest is that the strategic incentives of an upstream/pure operating 
carrier of a traditional codeshare product, that also offers its own online product in 
the said market (integrated upstream carrier), is likely to differ from an upstream 
carrier that does not offer its own competing online product (unintegrated upstream 
carrier). Specifically, the integrated upstream carrier optimally chooses not to elimi-
nate its margin for its codeshare products. A reason for such strategic behavior by 
the integrated upstream carrier is that by raising the price of its trip segment (the 
intermediate good price), this carrier is able to reduce the intensity of downstream 
competition for its own online product.
I also use the estimated model to perform counterfactual simulations that reveal 
how equilibrium prices, air travel demand, and consumer welfare are affected if 
integrated codeshare products were efficiently priced. I find that eliminating the 
upstream margin of integrated codeshare products results in a fall in prices of these 
products by a mean 19.86 percent. In addition, consumer surplus is predicted to 
increase by a mean 7.37 percent for an origin-destination market.
As this paper only constitutes a first attempt at an explicit empirical analysis of 
the vertical aspects of airline codesharing, there are several ways in which future 
research may build upon the model and the issues explored in this paper. For exam-
ple, the supply side of the model in its current form is unable to handle air travel 
products that have a subset of their trip segments codeshared, while the other seg-
ments are operated by unaffiliated carriers. Second, the model in its current form 
does not capture products that have each trip segment operated and marketed by 
unaffiliated carriers. Modifying the supply model to capture these types of products 
may prove useful if the model is used to study international air travel markets where 
these products are more popular. Thus, another possible extension to this research is 
to use the model to study international air travel markets where codeshare partners 
are distinct national carriers and less likely to offer competing online services in the 
said market.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables
Appendix B: Derivation of  Δ f 
Note that  Δ f =  Δ p /  Δ r . We already know how to compute  Δ r , where an element 
in  Δ r is given by  Δ r ( k, j ) =  
∂ d j 
 _∂ p k  . Therefore, to obtain  Δ f , the only additional com-
putation needed is  Δ p .
Let  Δ p be a matrix of derivatives of all final prices with respect to upstream 
prices. In other words,  Δ p tells an upstream carrier how all downstream final prices 
change given a change in the price for its pure operating services. Thus, an element 
in  Δ p is given by  Δ p ( k, j ) =  
∂p j 
 _
∂ s  k f 
  .
Table A2—List of Cities, States and Corresponding Airports in the Data Sample
City, state Airport code City, state Airport code
Austin, TX AUS Portland, OR PDX
Boston, MA BOS Philadelphia, PA PHL
Charlotte, NC CLT Phoenix, AZ PHX
Washington, DC DCA Pittsburgh, PA PIT
Denver, CO DEN Raleigh/Durham, NC RDU
Dallas, TX DFW Reno, NV RNO
Fort Lauderdale, FL FLL Fort Myers, FL RSW
New York City JFK San Diego, CA SAN
Las Vegas, NV LAS Seattle, WA SEA
Los Angeles, CA LAX San Francisco, CA SFO
New York City LGA San Jose, CA SJC
Miami, FL MIA Santa Ana, CA SNA
Chicago, IL ORD St. Louis, MO STL
Table A1—List of Airlines in the Sample and the Types of Products  
in the Sample They Are Involved in
Airline name Airline code
Types of products in the sample airline
is involved in 
American Airlines Inc. AA Online and traditional codeshare
Alaska Airlines Inc. AS Online and traditional codeshare
JetBlue Airways B6 Online only
Continental Air Lines Inc. CO Online only
Delta Air Lines Inc.  DL Online only
Frontier Airlines F9 Online only
AirTran Airways FL Online only
America West Airlines HP Online and traditional codeshare
Spirit Air Lines NK Online only
Northwest Airlines Inc.  NW Online only
ATA Airlines T Z Online and traditional codeshare
USA 3000 Airlines U5 Online only
United Air Lines Inc. UA Online and traditional codeshare
US Airways Inc. US Online and traditional codeshare
Southwest Airlines WN Online and traditional codeshare
Midwest Airline YX Online only
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Identical to the derivation process outlined in supplements to Villas-Boas (2007), 
I start with a first-order condition for a downstream firm. The downstream first-order 
condition for a codeshare product is given by
(21)  d j (p) +  ∑ 
k∈  r 
 
 
  ( p k −  s k f −  c k r)  
∂  d k (p) _
∂ p j 
  = 0.
If we totally differentiate equation (21) with respect to all final prices and an 
upstream price,  s n f , then
(22)  ∑ 
k=1
J
  {  ∂ d j  _∂ p k  +  ∑ m=1 
J
  [  Ω r ( m, j )   ∂  2 d m  _ ∂p j ∂ p k  ( p m −  s m f −  c m r ) ] +  Ω r ( k, j )  ∂ d k  _∂ p j  } d  p k 
 −  Ω r ( n, j )  
∂  d n  _
∂ p j 
 d s n f = 0, 
where k, j, m, and n are all indexing products. Let G be a J × J matrix with ele-
ments g ( j, k ) , where g ( j, k ) =  { ∂  d j  _∂ p k  +  ∑ m=1 J  [  Ω r ( m, j )   ∂ 2 d m  _ ∂ p j ∂ p k   ( p m −  s m f −  c m r ) ] + 
 Ω r ( k, j )  
∂ d k  _∂p j  } . Note that matrix G requires computing second-order derivatives of the 
demand function,   ∂ 
2 d m  _ ∂p j ∂ p k  . Since  ( p m −  s m 
f
 −  c m r ) can be expressed exclusively in 
terms of demand parameters (see equation (4)), matrix G does not require informa-
tion on upstream prices or marginal costs.
Let  H n be a J-dimensional column vector with elements h ( j, n ) , where h ( j, n ) 
=  Ω r ( n, j )  
∂  d n  _∂ p j  . For a given upstream price  s n 
f
 , equation (22) is computed for each of 
the J products. Given the above definitions for G and  H n , these J equations can be 
compactly represented by





d  s n f 
 =  G −1  H n .
 d p _ 
d  s  n f 
 is a J × 1 derivative vector, where the j th element tells us how the final price 
of product j changes as a result of a change in the upstream price of product n. The 
J × J matrix,  Δ p , is obtained by stacking all J derivative vectors (one for each prod-
uct n),  d p _ 
d  s  n f 
 , together.
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Appendix C. Estimation Details
The GMM parameter estimates can be obtained by solving the following problem:
(24)  Min 
α, β, σ, γ
 η′ Z Φ −1 Z′η, 
where η =  ( ξ    ψ) is a vector of demand (ξ) and supply (ψ) residuals; Z is a block 
diagonal matrix of instruments for the demand and supply equations; and  Φ −1 is a 
positive definite weight matrix. Matrix Z is specified as: Z =  (  Z d     0  0      Z s ) , where  Z d are 
instruments for the demand equation, and  Z s are instruments for the supply equa-
tion. The weight matrix  Φ −1 is specified as:  Φ −1 =  (  [ 1 _ n Z d ′ ξξ′ Z d ] −1                 0  0                  [ 1 _ n Z s ′ψψ′ Z s ] −1  ) .
The GMM optimization process in (24) can be made less burdensome if we 
exploit the fact that α, β, and γ enter the GMM objective function linearly. In par-
ticular, there exist closed-form expressions for the values of α, β, and γ that mini-
mize the objective function. Specifically,
(25)  ( α   β) = ( X d ′ Z d  Φ d −1  Z d ′  X d ) −1  X d ′  Z d  Φ d −1  Z d ′ δ
and
(26) γ = (W′  Z s  Φ s −1  Z s ′ W ) −1 W′  Z s  Φ s −1  Z s ′ Y, 
where  X d is a matrix of regressors in the demand model ( p jt and  x jt );  Z d is a matrix of 
demand instruments;  Φ d −1 is the portion of  Φ −1 that corresponds to demand moment 
conditions; δ is a vector of mean utilities for the products; W is the matrix of marginal 
cost shifters in the supply model;  Φ s −1 is the portion of  Φ −1 that corresponds to 
supply moment conditions;  Z s is a matrix of supply instruments; and vector 
Y = ln [ p −  m d 1 −  m u 1 ] comes from the supply equation (equation (12)). In 
the case of supply Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4, Y = ln [ p −  m d 2 −  m u 2 ] , 
Y = ln [ p −  m d 3 ] , and Y = ln [ p −  m d 4 −  m u 4 ] , respectively.
To recover the vector of mean utilities, δ, I exploit the estimation strategy that 
demand parameters must be chosen such that observed product shares are equal to 
predicted product shares, i.e.,
(27)  D jt =  d jt ( δ; σ )  for all j and t.
Let an initial set of values for the taste variation parameters in σ be denoted as  σ (0) . 
Given  σ (0) , we can numerically solve the system of equations in (27) for the cor-
responding vector of mean utility values,  δ (0) . With  δ (0) in hand, we can recover the 
associated values of  α (0) and  β (0) using (25), and compute the corresponding prod-
uct margin values,  m d,(0) 1 and  m u,(0) 1 . In addition, with  m d,(0) 1 and  m u,(0) 1 in hand, we 
can compute vector  Y (0) and therefore recover the associated  γ (0) via equation (26). 
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The demand and supply residuals are computed using, ξ jt (0) =  δ jt(0)  −  ( x jt  β (0)  +   α (0) p jt ) 
and ψ jt(0) = ln [ p jt −  m djt(0) 1 −  m ujt(0) 1 ] −  W jt  γ (0) , respectively.
In summary, once the closed-form expressions in (25) and (26) are substituted 
into the objective function, we can effectively perform the minimization search 
algorithm just over σ. In other words, the optimization in (24) effectively becomes
(28)  Min σ η′ Z Φ 
−1 Z′η.
Once the optimal   σ is found, then the associated parameter estimates   α ,   β , and   γ 
are recovered using equations (25), (26), and (27).
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